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Abstract 
Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) includes operator actions as elements in the set of the considered protection performances dur-
ing accident sequences. Nevertheless, its impact throughout a sequence is not usually analyzed dynamically. In this sense, it is convenient 
to make a more detailed analysis about its importance in the dynamics of the sequences, allowing for sensitivity studies with respect to 
human reliability and response times. For this reason, new developments in simulation software must be able to incorporate operator 
actions in conventional thermalhydraulic simulations. In this paper, we present one of these new tools, the TRETA/TIZONA-COPMA 
III coupled codes, which can be used for evaluating the impact in the final plant state of the execution by operators of procedures and the 
evaluation of the available times for the manual actions of the operators. This software tool consists of a closed-loop plant/operator 
simulator: a thermalhydraulic code for simulating the plant transient (TRETA for PWR NPPs and TIZONA for BWR NPPs) and 
the procedures processor (COPMA III) to simulate the operator actions requested by the procedures, both coupled by a data commu-
nication system which allows the information exchange (SWBus). The first pilot cases have been performed in order to analyze sequences 
initiated by secondary side breaks leading to loss of heat sink sequences in a PWR plant. These tests have been carried out using the real 
plant EOPs for COPMA-III and a PWR plant model for TRETA code. The results of these simulations are presented in this paper. 
1. Introduction 
Operator actions play an important role for the most 
part of accident sequences, although design analyses sum-
marized in safety analysis reports seldom include the con-
sideration of operator actions. Operators are required by 
compulsory emergency operating procedures (EOP) to per-
form some checks and actions from the very beginning of 
an accident. On the other side, probabilistic safety analysis 
(PSA) includes situations going beyond the design assump-
tions of automatic protection, and they also include opera-
tor actions as important contributors to the plant 
protection. Nevertheless, the dynamic effects of these 
actions on the process evolution are not usually analyzed 
in detail. In most cases, the safety verification studies lack 
an adequate consideration of operator actions, especially 
regarding how they may enhance the automatic actions or 
get into conflict with them. 
In the framework of this issue, simulation-based human 
reliability analysis (HRA) methods seem to provide a new 
direction for the development of advanced methodologies 
to study the operator action effects during accident 
sequences (see for example Schryver, 1988; Chandraseka-
ran et al., 1991; Cacciabue et al., 1992; Cacciabue, 1997; 
Jakubowski and Beraha (1996); Mosleh and Chang, 2004; 
Lee and Seong (2004)). Regarding these approaches, the 
simulation model for the performance assessment of 
nuclear power plants (NPP) operators is essential, implying 
the necessity to use simulation codes which include such 
effects in plant accident sequence simulations. 
In the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council (CSN) there is a 
working group which has developed a simulation-based 
methodology, named the integrated safety assessment 
(ISA), considering these new methods. A key aspect of 
this approach is the automatic generation of dynamic 
event trees stemming from an initiating event, based on 
an efficient technique to simulate all branches while taking 
into account different factors which may affect the 
dynamic plant behavior in each sequence. This methodol-
ogy is supported by a unifying theory which combines ele-
ments of traditional deterministic and probabilistic 
analyses. 
With regard to the consideration of the operator in the 
safety analysis, the development of new transient analysis 
methodologies integrating the operator actions and consid-
ering human factors began at the 1990s, after the evalua-
tion of the existing human factors methodologies and the 
proposal of its improvement, establishing the origin of 
the second generation HRA methodologies (Swain, 1990; 
Dougherty, 1990; Lydell, 1992; Bley et al., 1992). Addition-
ally, there was a common opinion that design and valida-
tion of procedures require to use better tools for their 
accomplishment (Hirschberg, 2004). Since 20 years ago, 
different tools are being developed to cover these needs. 
Most of them show some common characteristics that 
can be summarized as: 
• They are based on cognitive theory, taking into account 
errors related to decision making, situation assessment 
and other cognitive processes. 
• EOP computerization is based on task analysis (goals 
and means) or direct translation, considering or not con-
sidering stochastic parameters during its simulation 
(execution time, EoC/EoO, . . . ) . 
• Operator actions are integrated as boundary conditions 
in the input deck of usual plant simulators, or using 
dynamic approaches, based on different forms of simula-
tion (CDETs, DDETs, . . . ) . 
During the last years, the simulation of operator actions 
within the ISA methodology has been performed in several 
ways using different nature approaches, which are pre-
sented and described in detail in this paper. 
2. ISA methodology 
New analysis methodologies can be developed based on 
the possibility of using a simulator driver that is able to 
generate tree-structured simulation sequences. These tech-
niques, when combined with suitable methods for fault tree 
quantification, allow for the application of risk-oriented 
methodologies for various purposes, including the evalua-
tion of Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Acci-
dent Management Guides. An example of such a 
methodology is the ISA, a systematic verification approach 
which can be considered as an extension of PSA and acci-
dent analysis techniques, supported by the simulation sys-
tem schematically represented in Fig. 1. The classical 
PSA static event trees are replaced by a generalized 
dynamic event-tree concept based on the theory of proba-
bilistic dynamics (DDETs) (Devooght et al., 1996). Both 
components of the risk, damage and likelihood are consid-
ered in this approach in a balanced and simultaneous way. 
The main steps of this methodology are (Sanchez and 
Melara, 1996): 
(1) Identification of damage variables and definition of 
risk acceptable regions in a frequency-damage plot. 
(2) Initiating event (IE) and initial state selection. 
(3) Modeling the deterministic characteristics of the 
plant (plant dynamics modeling) including crew 
procedures. 
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Fig. 1. ISA methodology schematic representation. 
(4) Modeling the stochastic characteristics of the plant 
(reliability modeling). 
(5) Event sequence generation. 
(6) Analysis of the results and verification of the risk 
requirements. 
For a theoretical background and an in-depth descrip-
tion of the different modules depicted in Fig. 1 (see 
Izquierdo and Sanchez, 1994; Hortal and Izquierdo, 
1996; Izquierdo et al., 2002; Labeau and Izquierdo 
(2005a,b)). 
3. Previous experience in the simulation of EOPs 
A first approach of the CSN to consider the human 
actions in NPP transients, started in 1994, was the hard-
coded implementation of the EOPs as modules of TRETA 
code. This integration of the EOPs in the simulation was 
named handbook of operating instructions (HOI), result-
ing on the TRETA-HOI code version. 
A full-scale application of TRETA-HOI was the inde-
pendent verification of the event-tree delineation and com-
putation of the SGTR initiating event of a Spanish PWR 
plant (Izquierdo and Sanchez, 1994; Sanchez and Melara, 
1996). This study was carried out coupling TRETA-HOI 
with DYLAM for the calculation of DDETs. As a result 
of this work, a number of inconsistencies were found in 
the original delineation of the event tree, which were 
related to EOPs execution when combined with the com-
plex plant dynamics involved and the large number of 
branches. Also, it was concluded that the critical point is 
to create a sufficiently flexible EOP model to deal with all 
possible outcomes of an accident sequence simulation. 
Although this project finished with good results, it was 
concluded that some aspects of the HOI implementation 
could be improved: 
• HOI had some functional limitations. For example, it 
was assumed that the crew follows the EOP instructions 
in a sequential way, not allowing parallel execution of 
different EOPs, as it is expected to occur in real 
situations. 
• The EOP model was hard-coded, so any change of the 
model structure and parameters required edition of code 
sources files. 
At the same time, and taking into account these draw-
backs, a second approach was started to evaluate the via-
bility of the computerization of procedures with COPMA-
II, since this EOP simulation system allowed the comput-
erization of EOPs in a flexible way, solving the limitations 
found in previous works. As a result of this new 
approach, in 1996, another project was initiated by the 
Department of Energy Systems group (DES), with the 
objective of developing a combined system relying on 
TIZONA-MAAP for plant simulations and on COP-
MA-II for operator action implementation (Garcia and 
Queral, 1997). The plant model for the combined tool 
was set up, including manual control inputs needed for 
procedure execution. This work concluded that COP-
MA-II had several difficulties on the procedure computer-
ization process, mainly tied to the procedures 
computerization language of this system, the Prola lan-
guage. This issue, and the fact that COPMA-II was a 
machine dependent code, made this solution unworkable. 
For example, during the EOP computerization, it was 
considered necessary to add Prola instructions to code 
EOP steps related to actions which demanded manipula-
tions over components (pumps, valves, ...) to control 
physical parameters. Prola is not designed to allow any 
change in its grammar, so the new functionality added 
to the COPMA-II kernel could only be achieved with 
the participation of the COPMA-II developing team, by 
modifying COPMA-II kernel source files, coded in lisp 
programming language. In addition, a high workload 
was necessary to understand the whole system architec-
ture. This drawback has been solved partly in the new 
COPMA-III system version, which is highly modularized 
and based on user friendly flexible structures. Also, it is 
remarkable that after COPMA-II was developed, no sup-
port team was in charge of its maintenance and the source 
code was not available, so any following application 
would have important difficulties and those requiring soft-
ware modifications would be unaffordable. 
4. Description of the present approach 
At present, a new approach to develop this tool has been 
carried out. This work started after the release of the new 
COPMA-III software version. The simulation programs 
that compound the simulation package are (Fig. 2) 
(1) For the plant simulation the plant transient simulator 
codes TRETA and TIZONA are used for pressurized 
and boiling water reactors (PWR/ BWR) NPPs, 
respectively. These codes have been developed by 
the CSN including full scope models. The functional-
ity of these thermalhydraulic codes has been 
expanded, allowing control of the overall information 
flow with external codes, simulating the TH transient 
and determining when the operator actions must be 
considered. 
(2) The computerized procedure system is COPMA-III, 
developed by the OECD-Halden Reactor Project 
(HRP) and adapted with the contribution of the 
DES, CSN and HRP teams. It is able to manage an 
operational procedure database implemented in 
XML format. 
(3) The information exchange between TRETA/TIZO-
NA and COPMA-III is supported by the SWBus 
communication interface, also developed by HRP. 
One of its key aspects is that, independently of its imple-
mentation as a part of the ISA methodology, this tool can 
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Fig. 2. Schematic representation of the simulation package. 
be used as an stand-alone code for a variety of purposes, 
such as: 
• Realistic simulation of level 1 PSA sequences. 
• Supporting analysis for IPE and level 2 PSA. 
• Design and verification of operating procedures, includ-
ing Severe Accident Guides. 
• Analysis of normal, abnormal and emergency scenarios 
in order to derive criteria for operator training or eval-
uation activities. 
For the shake of comparison, we can highlight, among 
the nowadays more developed support tools, the ADS-
IDAC and the MDET-Crew module (Mosleh and Chang, 
2004; Kloos and Peschke, 2007). ADS-IDAC is a tool 
based on DDET simulation which has a cognitive model 
(IDAC) to simulate most of the cognitive aspects consid-
ered in the current HRA methodologies and the forthcom-
ing second generation ones, for instance EoC, situation 
assessment and decision making. The plant dynamics are 
simulated using a RELAP5 in-house adapted version. 
MDET tool is a combination of Monte Carlo and DDET 
simulations taking into account operator actions in the 
simulation via a specific module, named Crew module. This 
module has a set of operator actuations (EOPs computer-
ized steps) characterized with stochastic execution times 
and PSF, both calculated in execution time. In both tools, 
the EOP model is an abstraction using goals and means 
task analysis. 
As previously described, ISA is a methodology with sim-
ilar characteristics, also based on DDET simulation. 
Regarding the human actions simulation, TRETA/COP-
MA-III coupled system presents a EOPs model with a var-
iable detail level, which can range from a high abstraction 
degree up to individual instruction modeling, always using 
similar lexical elements than hardcopy procedures. There 
are similar tools, for example: EOP AS (Jakubowski and 
Beraha, 1996), ATOPS (Lee and Seong, 2004) and SCO-
OPE/SIPA (Chatry and Poizat, 1999); but they are not ori-
ented to be applied on PSA studies, just as it is the case of 
the ISA methodology. 
TRETA/COPMA-III tool, within the framework of the 
ISA methodology, presents similar capabilities than 
MDET-Crew module. The stochastic parameters consid-
ered in the simulations will be the time needed for task exe-
cution, calculated taking into account different distribution 
functions, and the Human Error Probability (HEP), both 
calculated on running time. COPMA-III/TRETA system 
does not include a cognitive operator model in its present 
design. This means that cognitive errors, as EoC/EoO, 
could be taken into account during the EOP model com-
puterization in a deterministic way. One of the most 
important advantages of this approach, compared with 
the other developments, is its highly modular implementa-
tion. This characteristic will allow for using TRETA/COP-
MA-III as a stand-alone tool to perform deterministic 
simulations. 
In the next sections, the different elements of the TRE-
TA/COPMA-III package are described in detail, enumer-
ating their advantages from previous approaches. 
4.1. TRETA and TIZONA codes 
TRETA and TIZONA are modular simulation systems 
that are able to simulate virtually all the plant systems, 
including control, protection and balance of plant, and 
both include the necessary models to simulate PWR and 
BWR plants, respectively (Izquierdo et al., 2007). The ther-
malhydraulic modules are based on elaborated models that 
combine a good representation of most of single and two-
phase water regimes with a relatively fast solution algo-
rithm. The implementation requirements respond to the 
following specifications: 
• The code is not oriented to one specific type of 
application. 
• The simulation problems are denned by the user in terms 
of a block diagram topology. A block is a minimal unit 
of process that computes time dependent output signals 
as functions of the input signals. The block diagram 
topology is denned by the interconnections between 
blocks, i.e. the outputs to inputs linkage. 
• Capability to perform tree-structured simulation, 
including event-tree automatic generation. 
• Capability to incorporate other single-application ori-
ented codes (i.e. RELAP5, MAAP, CONTAIN, ...) as 
modules using parallel computing techniques. 
• Capability to parallelize the calculations, if the problem 
admits a parallel algorithm solution. 
• Capability to admit different user-controlled numerical 
schemes, from explicit to fully implicit. 
The system has been provided with specific routines that 
constitute open connections of the code, in such a way that 
other simulation programs may be integrated in the simu-
lation of a physical system described by a block diagram. 
The connection capabilities are of two non-exclusive types, 
namely, initial conditions supply and boundary conditions 
exchange. To connect a code to the TRETA and TIZONA 
systems, certain communication routines must be inserted 
into it. The code should also have a structure compatible 
with the denned specifications. 
4.2. COPMA-III code 
COPMA-III is a procedure following system developed 
at the Halden Reactor Project (Bisio et al., 2000). It has 
been designed as an operator support system for guiding 
the execution of operating procedures. COPMA-III is con-
nected to the plant process computer, or to a plant simula-
tor, from which it receives the information needed for 
procedure execution. 
Some of the most important aspects of this procedures 
simulation system are 
• COPMA-III is a JAVA-based program, resulting on a 
more flexible system that its predecessor, COPMA-II. 
The communications library, process data base (PDB) 
and the system kernel are highly modularized, allowing 
to add new functionality for communications and proce-
dures simulation for specific applications. It is also pos-
sible to create rules for procedures management and 
execution as needed, making this system suitable for 
any reactor technology and procedure format (two-col-
umn or flow chart). It is even not restricted to NPP 
procedures. 
• New XPA (XML Processing for Antlr) structures and 
the new system kernel allow to create new instructions 
with different functions if it is needed, resulting in better 
EOPs modeling than with Prola language (COPMA-II). 
Both of them, XPA structures and system kernel, are 
designed to achieve at least the same semantic complex-
ity than in paper procedures, if desired. 
• XPA structures allow to change any simulation param-
eter of the model without interfering in other parts of 
the simulation system and models. This is an advantage 
compared with HOI EOP model. Also, new parameters, 
managed by COPMA-III system or external codes can 
be included in the procedure model, so it is possible, 
for example, to calculate execution times for each 
instruction taking into account plant and crew condition 
(workload, stress, . . . ) , updating them at run time. 
• The representation of the XPA procedure is made by 
XML structures. Comparing with Prola (COMPA-II), 
XPA procedures provide a high degree of flexibility on 
the computerization process and a wide configuration 
capability on their visualization. 
• COPMA-III can handle the execution of several proce-
dures in parallel, or even several instances of the same 
procedure. The activity concept, denned as an instance 
of a procedure that is currently being executed, supports 
this capability. This means that the system kernel man-
ages procedures in the same way that control room crew 
does. This feature, already present in COPMA-II, is an 
advantage with respect to HOI. 
Although COPMA-III is much more suitable for EOP 
computerization, some efforts have been done to maintain 
some interesting features of COPMA-II. In particular, a set 
of translation tools has been developed to allow the conver-
sion of Prola procedures to XPA-XML structures (Fig. 3). 
The interest in this translation capability arose from the 
existence of an important set of computerized procedures 
in this coding language. In addition, Prola procedures have 
some advantages for their maintenance, as compared to the 
new COPMA-III system. For example, the Prola language 
has a visual editor with useful tools (automatic flowchart 
diagram generation, logic condition visual builder, . . . ) , 
making the procedure coding more user-friendly. Besides, 
plain ASCII Prola files are human readable, allowing direct 
visual inspection, checking and modification. 
4.3. COPMA-III and TRETAITIZONA communications 
In its first release, COPMA-III software package was 
designed to be used in an interactive way via a man-
machine interface based on HTML (Fig. 4). This means 
that any demand, condition evaluation or component 
manipulation, can be shown in the HTML interface and 
evaluated and executed by a user in real time. 
However, COPMA-III can be used as a true procedure 
simulation system since this interface is a computer process 
that runs independently of the COPMA-III kernel and 
communicates with it. All of the operator interventions 
are received by the kernel as function calls resulting in 
instruction execution, information generation, etc. Due to 
this, COPMA-III can be used as an unattended simulator 
allowing automatic simulation via the module copma3 
implemented in TRETA/TIZONA, which automatically 
generates the same function calls that the user would if 
using the MMI interface (Fig. 2). 
The adopted solution to connect COPMA-III and the 
CSN simulators TRETA/TIZONA has been to use the 
Software Bus library, SWBus (Quiroga et al., 2006). The 
SWBus communication interface has been implemented 
in the COPMA PDB, the COPMA-III module in charge 
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Fig. 4. COPMA-III man-machine interface. 
of the communications between the COPMA kernel and 
external codes, and the TRETA module responsible for 
communicating with COPMA-III, named copma3. The def-
inition of the necessary functionality for the communica-
tion has been developed and tested. For this purpose, the 
different functions implemented in the copma3 module are 
• INITIALIZE_SESSION: It opens a new session with 
the COPMA system. 
• SPWRF WRAPPER: Sets values of variables of the 
COPMA kernel. The variables can have numeric as well 
as symbolic values (e.g. 1 or 'OPEN'). 
• OPEN OPERATOR SUBSCRIPTION: This function 
subscribes the COPMA variables to be used by TRE-
TA/TIZONA. Only the subscribed variables will be 
inspected, see PROCVAR UPDATES. Subscribed 
variables within the session are returned only if their 
values have been changed since the last call to PROC 
VAR UPDATES or GET_EVALUATIONS_AND_ 
VALUES. 
• TERMINATEJSESSION: This function closes a ses-
sion opened by INITIALIZEJSESSION. 
SWITCHTO_ACTIVITY: This function changes the cur-
rent activity to some other running in the current session. 
CREATE_ACTIVITY: This function creates a new 
activity in the current session to run the specified 
procedure. 
GETJNSTRUCTIONJDETAILS: This function is 
used to obtain details about the current instruction, 
for instance the execution time in seconds of the current 
instruction or the percentage of the maximum work load 
- 100% - to be allocated by the operation team when the 
instruction was executed. 
EXECUTEJCURRENTJNSTRUCTION: This func-
tion is used to execute the current instruction and to 
obtain the label of the next instruction. 
GET_EVALUATIONS_AND_VALUES: This func-
tion is used to check the status of monitors and update 
them according to the conditions that they survey. Also, 
this function gives information about the activities that 
are in a waiting state, and the conditions of the waits 
are checked. Finally, this function returns the updated 
values of the variables previously subscribed with 
OPEN OPERATOR SUBSCRIPTION. 
• END_ACTIVITY: This function finishes an activity 
started by CREATE_ACTIVITY. 
The communications testing was done by means of sev-
eral test procedures, which had the objective of performing 
a full range evaluation of the tool communications func-
tionality (Figs. 5 and 6). 
5. Plant and procedures models 
The new combined system needs the definition of the 
following elements: 
• A plant model for the TRETA/TIZONA codes, which 
must have the necessary interfaces to simulate the man-
ual actions on the required plant systems or 
components. 
• A procedures model with the most relevant steps of the 
real procedures, allowing it to simulate the scenario 
considered. 
Both of them are described in the following sections. 
sends to TRETA the requests for operator actions derived 
from the procedures. Manual controls have been included 
in the plant model, being able to receive the action requests 
from COPMA-III. TRETA is designed to manage which 
parts of the simulation have to be computed by each code 
at every moment. When a manual action request is received 
from COPMA-III, TRETA addresses it to the right desti-
nation. The capability for manual operation is not limited 
in TRETA, allowing the user to build as many manual con-
trols as desired. The CSN has two plant models available 
for TRETA, namely Asco and Jose Cabrera, which have 
been verified with several transients. The DES group has 
finished the verification of a generic PWR-W NPP model 
(Exposito and Queral, 2003), which has been used for the 
first pilot cases. This model is composed of the following 
parts (Fig. 7): 
• Vessel model. 
• Two-loop reactor coolant system model. 
• Reactor cooling pumps model. 
• Pressurizer model. 
• Secondary side model based on two steam lines. 
5.7. Plant model 
The first stage of the work has been oriented towards the 
simulation of PWR plant transients, and the thermalhy-
draulic code TRETA has been used for this purpose. It 
can simulate all kinds of plant systems including detailed 
automatic control. Besides, TRETA sends to COPMA-III 
information about the process variables needed to follow 
applicable operating procedures. COPMA-III, in turn, 
The two-loop RCS model considers TH behavior simi-
larities between the two loops without pressurizer to simu-
late the TH transient in NPP with three loops (Spanish 
PWR NPPs have a RCS with three cooling loops). 
The modeled engineered safeguards are the pressurizer 
and steam generators (SGs) relief and safety valves, steam 
and feedline isolation, safety injection and auxiliary feed-
water (AFW) systems. Additionally, the possibility of fail-
ure of one or more of these systems or their main 
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Fig. 5. Debugging information displayed by COPMA-III/PDB. 
components has been considered. The protection system 
model includes the automatic protection signals, including 
the capability of interaction with the operator. In parallel 
with the development of the PWR model, the DES group 
performed the Cofrentes NPP model for TIZONA code 
(Exposito et al., 2005). At this moment, the model has been 
validated and it is going to be used in the following simu-
lations of BWR plant transients. 
5.2. EOPs simulation 
It can be remarked that there is a tight connection 
between the semantics of the procedure language and the 
current functionality implemented in COPMA-III using 
XML semantics. In order to achieve this, the following 
instructions have been defined: 
• ACTION: Specifies an action/component manipulation 
to be performed on a component. 
• AUTOCHECK: Specifies a process condition to be 
automatically evaluated based on process variable val-
ues. A GOSUB, GOTO or INITIATE instruction may 
be executed depending on the truth-value of the process 
condition. 
• INITIATE: Creates an activity on a procedure. 
• FINISH: Terminates an activity. 
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gettimeload query (COPMA-KERNEL:GET-INSTRUCTION-DETAILS :SESSION S01 :PR0C-ID (QUOTE CIIITRT-SM-TETLUID) :STEP-ID (QUOTE 4) :INST-ID (QUOTE 1)) 
GET_INSTRUCTION_DETAILS RETURN: <<GET_INSTRUCTION_DETAILS»-> error code: 0 
STEP: Step: 4, INSTRUCTION: 1, TYPE: Message, Texec: 0, Taskload: 0 
GET_EVALUATIONS_AND_VALUES. RETURN: «GET-EVALUATIONS-AND-VALUES»-> error code: 0 
NumOutputs: 0 
NumMonitors: 0 
NumWaits: 1 
WAIT 0: <Activity: IPO, Step: 3, Instruction: 1, status: 0> 
NumActivities: 0 
GEL_EVALUATIONS_AND_VALUES. RETURN: «GET-EVALUATIONS-AND-VALUES»-> error code: 0 
NumOutputs: 0 
NumMonitors: 0 
NumWaits: 1 
WAIT 0: <Activity: IPO, Step: 3, Instruction: 1, status: 0> 
NumActivities: 0 
GET_EVALUATIONS_AND_VALUES. RETURN: «GET-EVALUATIONS-AND-VALUES»--> error code: 0 
NumOutputs: 0 
NumMonitors 0 
NumWaits: 1 
WAIT 0: <Activity: IPO, Step: 3, Instruction: 1, status: 1> 
NumActivities: 0 
-- TRETA: 
Instruction 1 (MESSAGE type) of Step 4, Procedure CIIITRT-SM-TETLUID executed at time 70.000000 
GET_INSTRUCTION_DETAILS RETURN: <<GET_INSTRUCTION_DETAILS»-> error code: 0 
STEP: Step: 4, INSTRUCTION: 2, TYPE: Action, Texec: 30, Taskload: 100 
PR0C_VAR_UPDATES 
PR0C_VAR_UPDATES PASSED: RETURN: «PR0C-VAR-UPDATES»-> error code: 0 
, Numoutputs: 0 
GET_EVALUATIONS_AND_VALUES. RETURN: «GET-EVALUATIONS-AND-VALUES»-> error code: 0 
NumOutputs: 0 
NumMonitors: 0 
NumWaits: 1 
WAIT 0: <Activity: IPO, Step: 3, Instruction: 1, status: 1> 
NumActivities: 0 
-- TRETA: 
Instruction 2 (ACTION type) of Step 4, Procedure CIIITRT-SM-TETLUID executed at time 100.000000 
GET_INSTRUCTIONS_DETAILS RETURN: «GET_INSTRUCTION_DETAILS>>-> error code: 0 
STEP: Step: 4, INSTRUCTION: 3, TYPE: Action, Texec: 30, Taskload: 100 
PR0C_VAR_UPDATES PASSED: RETURN: «PR0C-VAR-UPDATES»--> error code: 0 
, Numoutputs: 1 
variable 0: value: 0.010, name: VALENT.command, strval 0.01 
Fig. 6. Debugging information displayed by TRETA. 
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Fig. 7. Scheme of a PWR RCS model for TRETA code. 
GOSUB: Causes the control flow to jump to a specified 
instruction in the procedure. The first following 
RETURN instruction will let the flow of control return 
to the first instruction following the last executed 
GOSUB. 
GOTO: Causes the flow of control to jump to a specified 
instruction with no implicit link to a following 
RETURN instruction. 
MONITOR: Similar to AUTOCHECK but the condi-
tion is monitored within a specified time interval. 
RETURN: Causes the flow of control to return to the 
first instruction following the last executed, non-
returned GOSUB instruction. 
WAIT: Prevents the execution of the next instruction 
until the indicated time interval expires or the specified 
process condition is met. 
Table 1 
Memory structure for the valve component 
Valves (valvecomponent) 
Management Attribute Value Comment 
TRETA/TIZONA 
COPMA-III 
User 
position Numeric value 
opStatus OPEN, CLOSED, 
CLOSING . . . 
autoStatus AUTO, MAN 
command Numeric value 
autoSwitch ON, OFF 
openval Constant numeric value 
closeval Constant numeric value 
Valve opening 
Valve states 
Valve operating mode 
When the procedure demands an action on the valve 
VALVE, COPMA-III changes the VALVE.commmand attribute, in particular: 
- OPEN VALVE.command sets VALVE.command to the value specified in 
VALVE.openval 
- CLOSE VALVE.command sets VALVE.command to the value specified in 
VALVE.closeval 
Constant value set by user 
This set of instructions is enough for procedures com-
puterization, and its functionality has been tested during 
the computerization of the Westinghouse (PWR) and Gen-
eral Electric (BWR/6) EOPs, and it could be improved if 
necessary. 
With regard to EOPs, a review of the previous experi-
ence in this kind of simulation was performed and, in a sec-
ond stage, a generic methodology was selected to perform 
the procedure computerization (Queral et al., 2003). This 
methodology establishes: 
• Guidelines for computerizing the different elements pres-
ent in EOPs: 
- Action steps: distinguishing among steps which 
demand logic or numerical validations (logic or 
numerical statements) on the plant components/sys-
tems state or physical variables (AUTOCHECK), 
continuous monitoring of physical variables or plant 
components/systems state (MONITOR), specific 
actuation demand on plant components/systems 
(ACTION) and transitions to other procedures or 
Step 11 
11.2 
Step 13 
11.1 
If level in tank BP-20 < 30 % 
gotoEOP-E-23B. 
Start DG-3 
12.a.2 
Start PIS auxiliar pump 
12.b.2 
Check maximun aperture 
for valve PIS 1FCV 
Yes 
Step 15 
Fig. 8. E O P computerization example: task flow diagram. 
guides (INITIATE). Also, it establishes the required 
functionality to model immediate action steps, con-
tinuous steps, evaluation of physical variables time 
evolution during the transient and steps implying 
control actions during a time interval. 
- Cautions and notes: providing rules to computerize 
them as actions steps (specific or continuous) or spe-
cial operational modes for plant systems or compo-
nents under punctual conditions. 
- Foldout page: establishes the computerization of the 
actions informed on it as continuous monitoring steps 
which are applicable at any step in the procedure or 
procedure series. The most important of these actions 
are procedure transitions which allow immediate 
response to new symptoms as they appear. 
- FRGs status trees: defines the computerization of 
these trees as logic statements based on a set of 
AUTOCHECK instructions checked each minute 
using a WAIT instruction. This short checking time 
period is used due to FRGs status trees are monitored 
by the safety parameters display system (SDPD), and 
automatic monitoring system supervised by the 
operators. 
• Defines the memory structures and their attributes to 
manage information related to physical model parame-
ters and components/systems status: 
- Types of components: valves and pumps (e.g. 
Table 1). 
- System operation modes. 
- Physical variables. 
Two important simulation parameters have been imple-
mented for the manual actions demanded by EOPs and 
computerized in the COPMA-III procedures data base. 
First one is related with the time required for instruction 
execution by operators, and it can be obtained from several 
sources, one of them is the operator training timing in full-
scope simulators. For an example about how this data can 
be extracted from training sessions (see Park et al., 2005; 
Park and Jung, 2006, 2007). These data are usually aver-
aged for different sequences and operator psychological 
states and experience skills. An example of a first applica-
tion of these data source using the COPMA-III/TRETA 
simulator is provided in the next section. Another data 
source could be the application of the discrete event simu-
lation (DES) methodology. This methodology is being 
applied to obtain in a systematic way execution times for 
unitary operator actions (see for example Yow et al., 
2005). The second parameter is related with the workload, 
psychological and physical, which is assumed by the con-
trol room crew during the execution of the simulated 
instruction. Nowadays, the notion of workload in this con-
text and the objective methods for assessing it are under 
investigation. One of the most relevant research work in 
this direction is the one carried out by the KAERI human 
factor working group. Within the scope of this research, 
this group is assessing the existing methodologies to quan-
tify workload and complexity of the operator actions 
demanded by EOPs (Jung et al., 2001; Park et al., 2001, 
2004). Both research lines, DES and task load methodolo-
gies tested by the KAERI working group, have been 
• Additionally, the methodology establishes the steps to 
computerize procedures in a proper manner: 
(1) It specifies the modeling detail level for plant sys-
tems and components. 
(2) It clarifies the plant physical parameters which are 
important to execute the procedures. 
(3) It guides in the computerization of actions over 
components (pumps/valves), to control physical 
parameters within a range. 
By way of illustration, a simple procedure has been com-
puterized using this methodology. The first task consists of 
obtaining a task flow diagram from the procedure, consid-
ering the procedure instructions of interest for the simula-
tion (Fig. 8). Next, it is necessary to identify, one by one, 
each task action verb with a computerized instruction 
(Table 2) and to define the variables needed to manage 
the information related with this instructions, identifying 
plant systems, components or physical parameters (Table 
3). Finally, the computerization can be carried out, and 
the obtained computerized procedure should have the same 
functionality than the hardcopy procedure, as it can be 
checked by comparing the original task flow diagram with 
the computerized task diagram (Figs. 8 and 9). 
Table 2 
Type of steps, defined tasks and computerized instructions related to the 
example procedure 
Step 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Considered subtask 
11.1 
11.2 
12.a.l 
12.a.2 
12.b.l 
12.b.2 
13.a.l 
14.1 
14.2 
14.3 
14.4 
Instruction 
MONITOR 
ACTION 
AUTOCHECK 
ACTION 
AUTOCHECK 
ACTION 
MONITOR with INITIATE 
AUTOCHECK 
ACTION 
AUTOCHECK 
INITIATE 
Table 3 
Some of the defined tasks, computerized instructions and variables related 
to the example procedure 
Considered 
subtasks 
11.1 
11.2 
12.a.2 
14.1 
Instruction 
MONITOR 
ACTION 
ACTION 
AUTOCHECK 
Type of variable 
physmagnitude 
generalvariable 
pumpcomponent 
physmagnitude 
Variable name 
BP20LEVEL.ua/ue 
DG3. mo de 
PISPAUX. command 
BP20LEVEL. tendency 
considered in the implementation of the TASKEXEC and 
TASKLOAD parameters, and its future results will be 
tested and applied when the tool is developed. 
6. Application of the simulation package to the total loss of 
secondary heat sink 
In this section, the application of the simulation package 
to procedures simulation is described. First part is dedi-
cated to the methodology developed for the computeriza-
tion of the EOPs and its application to the sequences 
that have been simulated. The following section corre-
sponds to the simulation of the transients selected as pilot 
application and the results obtained. 
6.1. Analysis of the EOPs and their computerization 
The sequences selected for checking the tool functional-
ity have been the total loss of secondary heat sink. An in-
depth study was carried out to define the detail and scope 
of the procedures model (Exposito and Queral, 2004): 
(1) FSAR sequences related to TLFW and SLB were 
studied. 
Step 11 
11.1 
MONITOR 
BP20LEVEL.raZi(e 
11.2 
ACTION 
DG3.mode 
Step 15 
Fig. 9. EOP computerization example: computerized EOP flow diagram. 
(2) PSA studies were analyzed, extracting the informa-
tion related to human actions considered for these 
sequences. When possible, EOPs and steps regarding 
backup and mitigating actions were identified. As a 
result of this work a simplified event tree for these 
sequences was depicted (Fig. 10). 
(3) These EOPs were revised, seeking for which of them 
were used in each event-tree sequence, allowing to 
establish the computerized EOPs model structure. 
The computerization of the most relevant EOPs 
related with this kind of sequences was carried out 
(Exposito et al., 2006): reactor trip (E-0), reactor trip 
response (ES-0.1), loss of primary or secondary cool-
ant (E-l), response to loss of heat sink (FR-H.l), loss 
of recirculation capability (ECA-1.1), safety injection 
(SI), termination (ES-1.1) and transition to SI recir-
culation (ES-1.3). 
(4) Emergency response guidelines basis were revised to 
clarify the task and goals involved in the actions com-
puterized and to verify that its functionality covered 
the original designed one. 
(5) The final stage of the work was the review of the sci-
entific and technical bibliography about these kind of 
transients considering technical reports, NUREGs, 
papers, etc. The objective was to get a detailed knowl-
edge of the plant phenomenology for these sequences, 
to acquire a general view of the associated problem-
atic and to define the plant physical parameters of 
interest. 
During the computerization process, it was carried out a 
preliminary testing to check the EOP execution, using man-
ual simulation of operator actions. This task permitted the 
detection of the need to improve COPMA-III to manage 
EOP hierarchy (ORG/FRG). In its current version, it is 
possible to take into account it implicitly, but it is necessary 
to implement this functionality explicitly in the EOP model 
attributes. 
Also, it has been necessary to interpret some steps of the 
EOPs, especially those that require operator judgment of 
the plant conditions, like in manual control of the AFW 
flow during a loss of feedwater. In this sense, it was con-
cluded that EOP computerization is the most delicate stage 
of the simulation model development, being necessary the 
interaction with operators and operators trainers to under-
stand which are the real actuations performed by operators 
in some situations. 
Fig. 10 depicts a generic PSA tree for the total loss of 
secondary heat sink sequences and the related procedures. 
The motivations for this selection were that these sequences 
are well known and that they are complex enough to test 
the simulation package functionality. 
For these sequences, the main objectives specified in 
EOPs, highly summarized, are (Exposito and Queral, 
2004): 
• To check and verify the correct actuation of all the sys-
tems and safeguards demanded. The actuations per-
formed by the operator to verify and control the AFW 
flow and the RCS temperature are included in this 
category. 
• To start the feed and bleed cooling procedure in case of 
loss of secondary heat sink. 
These and other less relevant operator actions have been 
implemented in the COPMA-III computerized procedures 
(Table 4). All the interfaces needed for these manual 
actions have been included in the PWR model for TRETA 
code. The manual controls implemented actuate as 
required by EOPs and their main objective is to establish 
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Fig. 10. Total loss of secondary heat sink generic event tree. 
Table 4 
Main operator actions implemented in computerized EOPs and plant 
model for TLFW sequences 
Operator action EOP-STEP Code reference 
StopRCPs FR-H.1-3 A-RCPSTOP 
RCS depressurization FR-H.l-6b A-RCSBLOW 
Secondary depressurization FR-H.l-6e A-SGBLOW 
Start RCS feed FR-H.1-9 A-RCSFEED 
Start RCS bleed FR-H.1-12 A-RCSBLEED 
• A-RCSBLOW: RCS depressurization to establish opti-
mal conditions for initiating RCS feed. 
• A-SGBLOW: secondary depressurization for making 
possible the SGs feed by means of the condensate 
pumps. 
• A-RCSFEED: initiates the RCS feed running two 
CVCS high pressure pumps. 
• A-RCSBLEED: initiates the RCS bleed opening two 
pressurizer PORVs. 
Table 5 
Averaged time for EOP E-0 execution and event diagnosis time from 
reactor trip for LSLB, TLFW, LOCA, LOOP, SBO and SGTR sequences 
(Park et al., 2005) 
Table 6 
Event diagnosis time from reactor trip for LOOP, loss of RHRS, SGTR, 
LOCA, loss of heat sink and LNFW sequences (Villemeur et al., 1986) 
Initiating event (EOP) Average 
LOOP (I4B) 
Loss of RHRS (IRRA2) 
SGTR (A3) 
LOCA (A10) 
Loss of heat sink (Hl.l) 
LFW (H2) 
Average 
6 min 50 s 
2 min 15s 
12 min 
6 min 10 s 
3 min 5 s 
2 min 50 s 
5 min 32 s (332 s) 
7 min 24 s 
6 min 45 s 
1 min 24 s 
6 min 
2 min 5 s 
1 min 28 s 
3 min (180 s) 
Table 7 
Task completion time data in coping with TLFW (Park et al., 2005) 
Task Time average Standard 
(s) deviation (s) 
Stoppage of all RCPs 415.4 246.3 
Securing the water inventory of SGs 556.9 137.6 
Checking criteria for F&B 565.6 286.4 
Confirming the natural circulation 791.6 161.8 
of RCS 
steady and safe conditions after the correct actuation of 
protection systems and safeguards. Some of their specifica-
tions are: 
• A-RCPSTOP: stops RCPS to take advantage of the 
remaining inventory in the SGs during loss of heat sink 
sequences. 
Regarding the executing time implemented for every 
action computerized in the EOPs model, a preliminary 
approach was carried out, using data from timing operator 
DBA 
LSLB 
TLFW 
LOCA 
LOOP 
SBO 
SGTR 
Performance time of 
the diagnosis 
Average (s) 
182.4 
137.2 
135.8 
106.7 
101.3 
195.9 
EOP 
<x(s) 
72.4 
89.8 
47.8 
39.9 
55.3 
106.7 
Diagnosis time from 
reactor 
Averag 
412.7 
300.8 
357.5 
271.7 
251.7 
403.6 
trip 
5(S) <x(s) 
128.7 
157.8 
134.9 
79.4 
78.6 
199.1 
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Fig. 11. EOP structure for the loss of total feedwater transient: ORG to 
CSF monitoring transition. 
training in full-scope simulators (Tables 5-7). The data 
obtained from Tables 5 and 6 were used to establish the 
time needed to start E-0 EOP, while the data of Table 7 
were used for the different actions computerized in the 
FRG FR-H.l, described in detail in the next section. 
6.2. Simulation results for the first pilot case: total loss of 
secondary heat sink 
The initiating event of the transient is a break located at 
the normal feedwater header at 120 s (the event sequence is 
presented in Table 11). This event brings out the loss of 
normal feedwater, remaining unavailable during the tran-
sient. After this moment, the SGs level loss leads to the 
reactor scram at 149.63 s (low SG level signal in both 
SGs) (Fig. 14). This signal involves the AFWS actuation, 
however, the most important assumption in this simulation 
is that this safeguard system fails. 
The turbine trip is induced by the reactor scram at 
149.74 s. Because of the fast SGs depressurization at the 
beginning of the transient and the unavailability of any 
feedwater flow source (Figs. 15 and 16), the CSF monitor-
ing tree related with the heat sink is in red condition at 
166.4 s (Fig. 12). That is 48 s after the reactor scram. This 
fact would imply the transition to the FRG H.l at that 
moment if the control room crew checked the FRG state 
in the SPDS display. However, in the simulation, this 
aspect has not been considered, taking into account only 
the CSF monitoring when it is demanded by the EOPs. 
This consideration postponed the entry in FRG H.l in 
the simulation until 470 s, instead of 166.4 s. 
The subsequent evolution of the transient is determined 
by the manual actions performed by the operator. The 
most important required by the FRG H.l are (Table 4, 
Fig. 13): 
• Manual RCPs trip, task CD. 
• RCS and secondary depressurization, tasks © and ®. 
• Feed and bleed criteria monitoring and execution of the 
maneuver, tasks ® and ©. 
• To establish steady cooling conditions and lower the 
RCS pressure to values below the LPIS delivery head 
(these actions are not considered in the current 
simulations). 
The execution of the EOP E-0 is initiated at 300 s, 150 s 
after the reactor scram (see Table 8) verifying the auto-
matic actuation of the reactor protection system and the 
core subcritical condition, steps 1-3 (Fig. 11). Afterwards, 
the EOP ES-0.1 is initiated, reactor trip response, at 410 s. 
This transition to EOP ES-0.1 is possible since the RCS 
and SGs pressures are below 130 and 48.1 kg/cm2 (Figs. 
17 and 18) not considering the SI actuation. 
As of this moment, the monitoring of the CSFs status 
tree (F-0) is initiated simultaneously with the EOP ES-0.1 
execution. Considering 60 s as the time spent in CSF state 
checking using the SPDS, at 470 s the ES-0.1 EOP is left, 
transferring the execution to the FRG H.l, response to 
the loss of heat sink (Table 9). During this time interval, 
the strong decrease of the SGs inventories continues due 
to the actuation of the steam dump bypass (Figs. 15 and 
16). 
The first operator action demanded by the FRG H.l is 
the RCPs stopping at 725 s, step 3 of the procedure 
(Fig. 13). The RCPs stopping is unconditional, mainly 
due to the fact that the loss of SG inventory is reduced 
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Fig. 12. EOP structure for the loss of total Feedwater transient: CSF monitoring to FRG FR-H.l transition. 
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Fig. 14. Total loss of feedwater: SGs narrow range level. 
Table 8 
Assigned time for EOP E-0 subtasks 
Subtask 
Entry 
1-3.1 
4.1 
Table 9 
Assigned time for EOP ES-0.1 subtasks 
Subtask 
Entry 
1-5.1 
T E ( s ) 
150 
80 
30 
T E ( s ) 
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Fig. 15. Total loss of feedwater: SGs wide range level. 
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Fig. 16. Total loss of feedwater: total SGs FW, SD, HPSI (manual 
actuation), and PZR PORVs mass flows. 
Table 10 
Assigned time for EOP FR-H.l subtasks 
Subtask TE (s) 
Entry 
1-2.1 
3.1 
4-6.a.l 
6.b.l 
6.c-d.l 
6.e.l 
7.a-b.l 
8.1 
9.1 
10-11.1 
12.1 
13-18.1 
19.1 
20.1 
60 
120 
75 
60 
30 
20 
30 
50 
60 
95 
30 
30 
300 
30 
30 
in natural circulation and the RCPs coolant heating is 
avoided, providing more time for SG inventory recov-
ering actions and, therefore, increasing the possi-
bilities for avoiding the execution of the F&B cooling 
maneuver. 
Heat sink recovery actions related with feeding the SGs 
by means of the condensate system imply the primary and 
secondary depressurization to 140 and 28 kg/cm2. These 
actions, instructions 6.b y 6.e of the FR-H.l procedure, 
are performed at 815 and 865 s respectively (Table 10, Figs. 
17 and 18). While these actions are performed, the inven-
tory of the SGs is diminishing, reaching the F&B condition 
at 870 s (Fig. 15). Considering that the recovery of the 
AFWS and the feed by means of the condensate pumps 
are impossible due to simulation assumptions, the evalua-
tion of this condition is made at 975 s, initiating the feed 
to the RCS by means of the SI manual actuation at 
1070 s and the bleeding of the primary at 1130 s, steps 9 
and 12 of FR-H.l (Fig. 16). Finally, the simultaneous actu-
ation of feed and bleed tends to establish steady conditions 
in RCS pressure and temperature, as shown in Figs. 17 and 
19. The final state consists of a dynamic balance of the feed 
and the bleed depending on the volumes of the income and 
-
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Fig. 19. Total loss of feedwater: temperatures in the RCS. 
outcome flows, the residual heat and the RCS pressure 
(Loomis and Cozzuol, 1988). 
The pressure is the most important system variable to 
assess long term cooling with low pressures, as it is required 
by EOPs to allow LPSI delivery. Several studies have been 
carried out to establish which is the optimal F&B proce-
dure for lowering pressure to those values, taking into 
account different time windows depending on the amount 
of residual heat (Lanore et al., 1987; Champ and Cornille, 
1989) or different configurations for feed and bleed (one/ 
two HPSI pumps and one/two pressurizer PORVs) 
(Demuth et al., 1982; Loomis and Cozzuol, 1988). This 
issue is not considered in our study, finishing the simula-
tion when the feed and bleed flows tend to be steady, 
regardless of the steady pressure value. 
7. Conclusions 
TRETA/COPMA-III coupled system is capable to per-
form simulations integrating the effect of operator actions 
in the nuclear plant state during transient and accidental 
sequences. This tool is based on a EOPs model with a var-
iable detail level, which can differ from a high abstraction 
degree to an instruction by instruction computerized EOP 
version, always using similar lexical elements than hard-
copy procedures. TRETA/COPMA-III tool, within the 
framework of the ISA methodology, presents similar capa-
bilities than other software tools that are currently under 
development and testing, MDET-Crew module or ADS-
ID AC. The stochastic parameters considered in the simula-
tions will be the execution time, calculated taking into 
account different distribution functions, and HEP calcula-
tion in execution time. Finally, EoC and EoO can be taken 
into account as configurable boundary conditions in the 
EOPs model. One of its key aspects, and an advantage 
compared with the other developments, is that indepen-
dently of its implementation as a part of the ISA method-
ology, this tool can be used as a stand-alone code for 
evaluating the impact of procedures and guidelines execu-
tion by operators in the final state of the plant and the eval-
uation of the available times for manual actions of the 
operator in a flexible way. 
At this stage of the work, several practical tests have 
been carried out and all functionality needs denned for 
the TRETA/COPMA-III tool have been validated. The 
coupled codes are capable of simulating single sequences 
with all the requirements of testability and repeatability. 
When this part of the work is finished, a more ambitious 
simulation exercise will be undertaken for analysis of the 
Table 11 
TLFW: manual and automatic actions timing sequence 
Time (s) Description 
Automatic actuations 
120 
149.63 
149.74 
Main normal feedwater header break (loss of normal feedwater) 
Low SGs level signal. Reactor scram and AFWS actuation demand signals. AFWS failed (total loss of feedwater) 
Turbine trip 
Manual actions!operator performance 
166.4 
300 
410 
470 
725 
815 
865 
870 
975 
1070.15 
1130 
1500 
Red condition in CSF (SPDS): F-0.3 status tree - FR-H.l FRG 
EOP entry (EOP E-0) 
Event diagnosis is assumed (TLFW) 
SI is unnecessary. Task 4.1 
Transitioned to EOP ES-0.1. Task 4.1 
CSF status tree monitoring initiated. 
Transitioned to FRG FR-H.l. Task 1-5.1 
Manual RCPs trip (A-RCPSTOP). Task 3.1 
RCS depressurization (A-RCSBLOW). Task 6.b.l 
Secondary depressurization (A-SGBLOW). Task 6.e.l 
F&B condition becomes true 
F&B entry condition is evaluated. Task 8.1 
F&B maneuver: RCS feed initiated (A-RCSFEED). Task 9.1 
F&B maneuver: RCS bleed initiated (A-RCSBLEED). Task 12.1 
Dynamic equilibrium between feed and bleed is reached with core cooling in progress. F&B success criteria satisfied 
impact of EOPs execution by operators in the final state of 
the plant and the evaluation of the available response times 
for manual actions. Furthermore, more improvements 
have been considered although the development stage of 
the software tool is nearly finished. 
On the other hand, emergency operating procedures 
need to be evaluated in a PSA context where multiple 
sequences starting from the same operating conditions 
have to be considered. In particular, the simulation codes 
should be able to communicate with a general driver, 
known as the simulation scheduler, and to receive some 
signals from it asking for storing or retrieving a particular 
simulation spot, or to suspend, finish or restart the simu-
lation of a particular sequence. In its current degree of 
development, COPMA-III does not include these features 
yet. It is expected, however, that they will be incorporated 
in the near future and that the applicability of the com-
bined tool can be extended to the automatic simulation 
of dynamic event trees, just as it is needed for the final 
implementation of the tool as a part of the ISA 
methodology. 
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